By 1916 the war on the Western Front had bogged down into a stalemate, with trenches and barbed wire running across Europe from the Mediterranean to the North Sea.
The reason for the battle of the Somme was that the French in the south were under great pressure from the Germans. A British attack in the north, across the Somme, would draw the Germany army away and give the French a breather.
At the Somme, the British infantry had 150,000 men against the German's 70,000. The attack was preceded by a massive week-long barrage of a thousand artillery guns, the general idea being to destroy the ground and allow the infantry to walk in and occupy it.
It didn't turn out that way. The defensive lines were still intact because the British artillery wasn't heavy enough, because the artillerists were ill trained, and because there was no special device to open up the barbed wire, which was far more formidable than the barbed wire we're used to today. The Brits used anti-personnel air-bursting shrapnel shells instead of contact high explosives that would have opened gaps in the wire. Military planners had prepared for a fast-moving war and had overproduced shrapnel so the artillery used what was available.
So why had the anti-personnel shells not destroyed the defenders? After all, that was their designated purpose, yet German casualties in the bombardment were slight. Careful research by the Germans had produced the Stahlhelm, a thick steel helmet precisely made to protect the head. The Allies had no equivalent. The Germans had also had two years to prepare underground dugouts, sometimes thirty feet deep, protected by timber and even concrete. Further, the British had planned to use the trenches both to move new troops to the front lines and carry wounded to the rear. The trenches were too narrow and logistics broke down. The British troops were delayed because they didn't know where to go. It was six hours before the commanders learned of the problem.
If I can make a few editorial observations, by 1916 the war was beginning to look a lot like the trench warfare at the end of the American Civil War. Both the North and the South had built wide, sturdy trenches with frequent "bombproofs" that could shelter the men. The Germans more or less used the same techniques but the British did not. One of the reasons the Brits had so few dugouts is that the planners felt that, once inside the dugouts, the men would refuse to come out and be fired upon.
Why were the Brits so vulnerable crossing No Man's land? First, they carried a minimum of 72 pounds of personal equipment, plus ammunition or other supplies. They were slow and had great difficulty with the wire. And since the Germans had mostly survived, they were able to fire across the open plain with machine guns. Again, during the Civil War, it was repeatedly demonstrated that such tactics do not work against advanced technology in attacking a fortified position head on. A head-on attack with infantry in line of battle worked for Napoleon's inaccurate muskets. It didn't work against the rifled bullets of the Civil War or the machine guns of the Somme.
The British losses were staggering but planners learned from the calamity. They also learned from their French Allies and their German enemies. Tactics and weapons more suitable to the conditions were used.
I don't know if programs like this interest everyone. I doubt it. But as an anthropologist war fascinates me. It's like a smoldering disease that becomes symptomatic from time to time. And no one has found a reliable way of keeping it suppressed.
The reason for the battle of the Somme was that the French in the south were under great pressure from the Germans. A British attack in the north, across the Somme, would draw the Germany army away and give the French a breather.
At the Somme, the British infantry had 150,000 men against the German's 70,000. The attack was preceded by a massive week-long barrage of a thousand artillery guns, the general idea being to destroy the ground and allow the infantry to walk in and occupy it.
It didn't turn out that way. The defensive lines were still intact because the British artillery wasn't heavy enough, because the artillerists were ill trained, and because there was no special device to open up the barbed wire, which was far more formidable than the barbed wire we're used to today. The Brits used anti-personnel air-bursting shrapnel shells instead of contact high explosives that would have opened gaps in the wire. Military planners had prepared for a fast-moving war and had overproduced shrapnel so the artillery used what was available.
So why had the anti-personnel shells not destroyed the defenders? After all, that was their designated purpose, yet German casualties in the bombardment were slight. Careful research by the Germans had produced the Stahlhelm, a thick steel helmet precisely made to protect the head. The Allies had no equivalent. The Germans had also had two years to prepare underground dugouts, sometimes thirty feet deep, protected by timber and even concrete. Further, the British had planned to use the trenches both to move new troops to the front lines and carry wounded to the rear. The trenches were too narrow and logistics broke down. The British troops were delayed because they didn't know where to go. It was six hours before the commanders learned of the problem.
If I can make a few editorial observations, by 1916 the war was beginning to look a lot like the trench warfare at the end of the American Civil War. Both the North and the South had built wide, sturdy trenches with frequent "bombproofs" that could shelter the men. The Germans more or less used the same techniques but the British did not. One of the reasons the Brits had so few dugouts is that the planners felt that, once inside the dugouts, the men would refuse to come out and be fired upon.
Why were the Brits so vulnerable crossing No Man's land? First, they carried a minimum of 72 pounds of personal equipment, plus ammunition or other supplies. They were slow and had great difficulty with the wire. And since the Germans had mostly survived, they were able to fire across the open plain with machine guns. Again, during the Civil War, it was repeatedly demonstrated that such tactics do not work against advanced technology in attacking a fortified position head on. A head-on attack with infantry in line of battle worked for Napoleon's inaccurate muskets. It didn't work against the rifled bullets of the Civil War or the machine guns of the Somme.
The British losses were staggering but planners learned from the calamity. They also learned from their French Allies and their German enemies. Tactics and weapons more suitable to the conditions were used.
I don't know if programs like this interest everyone. I doubt it. But as an anthropologist war fascinates me. It's like a smoldering disease that becomes symptomatic from time to time. And no one has found a reliable way of keeping it suppressed.
