The Battle of Normandy didn't end with the securing of the beach head, although that presents history buffs with a nicely structured narrative ending. Instead, the Allied forces quickly became bogged down beyond the beaches. The Americans fought for yards through the bocage country (now disappearing under the bulldozers) that seemed made for defense and had been misinterpreted from the air as nothing more than hedges.
To the east, the British and Canadians were faced with less extensive hedgerows but the rolling, open plain and scattered villages were hardly any more difficult. That's the subject of this program.
The British goal was to take Caen by the end of D Day. They never came close. By the way, I've usually had trouble with the French pronunciation of Caen, as opposed to Cannes, the resort town on the Riviera. Non-French speakers can approximate the former with "Cawn" and the latter by "Can." Only make sure those terminal "n"s are weak.
I won't bother going through the details of the efforts to take Caen. And the DVD DOES get into detail, sometimes following one small unit for several minutes. There are, however, no experts or talking heads, only the sonorous narration of Jonathan Booth.
The occupation of Caen, which was supposed to take one day but wound up taking several weeks, was the responsibility of Bernard Montgomery and he usually comes in for a good deal of blame for being too cautious or inept. Much of the criticism comes from Americans who, once having gotten through the bocage, burst out of the Cotentin peninsula and swept eastward.
It's a simple explanation and like most simple explanations is incomplete. It doesn't take into account that the British and Canadians were faced with Germany's finest units, elite SS divisions and the devoted Hitlerjugend. They were highly skilled at rapid response and in taking advantage of every defensive possibility in the terrain. They had no control over the air, but they had other advantages. Here's a quote from Hastings' and Jenkins' "Overlord."
"The Allies in Normandy faced the finest fighting army of the war, one of the greatest that the world has ever seen. This is a simple truth that some soldiers and writers have been reluctant to acknowledge, partly for reasons of nationalistic pride, party because it is a painful concession when the Whrmacht and SS were fighting for one of the most obnoxious regimes of all time. The quality of the Germans' weapons -- above all tanks -- was of immense importance. Their tactics were masterly: stubborn defence; concentrated local fire-power from mortars and machine-guns; quick counter attacks to recover lost ground. Units fought on even when cut off, which was not a mark of fanaticism, but of sound tactical discipline, when such resistance in the rear reduced the momentum of Allied advances."
The war ended almost sixty years ago. Time enough to face some facts. Historians like Steven Ambrose have noted that the French people of Normandy tended to be sullen and uncooperative, while those of southern France were happy and welcoming. Psychologists would describe this difference as a "state" rather than a "trait." Of course the northern French were less happy over being liberated. Under the shelling and bombing, chiefly of the Allies, their towns and cities were bloodstained ruins.
But on the whole the writers here have stuck to military operations with occasional ventures into the character of the commanders involved. And the British and Canadian drive for Caen is often a neglected topic in discussions of the attack on Festung Europa. No thrilling parachute drops as in Holland. No storming the beaches as on D Day. No momentous tank battles as at Kursk. Just a stubborn and extremely costly slogging away at a determined enemy, with most attacks ending in failure for our side.
To the east, the British and Canadians were faced with less extensive hedgerows but the rolling, open plain and scattered villages were hardly any more difficult. That's the subject of this program.
The British goal was to take Caen by the end of D Day. They never came close. By the way, I've usually had trouble with the French pronunciation of Caen, as opposed to Cannes, the resort town on the Riviera. Non-French speakers can approximate the former with "Cawn" and the latter by "Can." Only make sure those terminal "n"s are weak.
I won't bother going through the details of the efforts to take Caen. And the DVD DOES get into detail, sometimes following one small unit for several minutes. There are, however, no experts or talking heads, only the sonorous narration of Jonathan Booth.
The occupation of Caen, which was supposed to take one day but wound up taking several weeks, was the responsibility of Bernard Montgomery and he usually comes in for a good deal of blame for being too cautious or inept. Much of the criticism comes from Americans who, once having gotten through the bocage, burst out of the Cotentin peninsula and swept eastward.
It's a simple explanation and like most simple explanations is incomplete. It doesn't take into account that the British and Canadians were faced with Germany's finest units, elite SS divisions and the devoted Hitlerjugend. They were highly skilled at rapid response and in taking advantage of every defensive possibility in the terrain. They had no control over the air, but they had other advantages. Here's a quote from Hastings' and Jenkins' "Overlord."
"The Allies in Normandy faced the finest fighting army of the war, one of the greatest that the world has ever seen. This is a simple truth that some soldiers and writers have been reluctant to acknowledge, partly for reasons of nationalistic pride, party because it is a painful concession when the Whrmacht and SS were fighting for one of the most obnoxious regimes of all time. The quality of the Germans' weapons -- above all tanks -- was of immense importance. Their tactics were masterly: stubborn defence; concentrated local fire-power from mortars and machine-guns; quick counter attacks to recover lost ground. Units fought on even when cut off, which was not a mark of fanaticism, but of sound tactical discipline, when such resistance in the rear reduced the momentum of Allied advances."
The war ended almost sixty years ago. Time enough to face some facts. Historians like Steven Ambrose have noted that the French people of Normandy tended to be sullen and uncooperative, while those of southern France were happy and welcoming. Psychologists would describe this difference as a "state" rather than a "trait." Of course the northern French were less happy over being liberated. Under the shelling and bombing, chiefly of the Allies, their towns and cities were bloodstained ruins.
But on the whole the writers here have stuck to military operations with occasional ventures into the character of the commanders involved. And the British and Canadian drive for Caen is often a neglected topic in discussions of the attack on Festung Europa. No thrilling parachute drops as in Holland. No storming the beaches as on D Day. No momentous tank battles as at Kursk. Just a stubborn and extremely costly slogging away at a determined enemy, with most attacks ending in failure for our side.
